irtually all of the vast increase in the size of the U.S. labor force that has occurred since World War II, a total of some 46.3 million jobs between 1948 and 1986, is accounted for by the rise in service-sector employment" (Baumol, Blackman, and Wolff, 1992) . The growth of the service sector has been connected with an array of phenomena and blamed for a plethora of problems. Debates about "deindustrialization" (Petit, 1986) , the decline in the rate of productivity growth (Fuchs, 1968; Baumol, 1985) , changes in the distribution of income (Grubel and Walker, 1989) , and the like all involve heated discussions of reasons for and consequences of growth in the service sector.
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1 Our goal is not to resolve these debates, but rather to shed some analytical and empirical light on one possible cause of the rapid growth of the service sector: differential taxation of goods and services.
Historically, and currently, most U.S. states levy a general sales tax on exchanges of goods but not services. Many of these taxes were inaugurated in the 1930s but expanded in scope and intensity during the postwar period (Due and Mikesell, 1994) . In 1950, 17 states and the District of Columbia did not yet levy a general sales tax, and no state's rate exceeded three percent, with the median rate being two percent. By 1994, 45 states and the District of Columbia had adopted a sales tax and all, except Colorado, had a rate exceeding three percent, with the median rate being five percent (Due and Mikesell, 1994) . Moreover, the increase in state tax rates understates growth in the use of sales taxation because of the increased local government use of this tax. Between 1950 and 1990 , local government sales tax revenues grew more than twice as fast as state government sales tax revenues (ACIR, 1993) .
Recently, economists have examined the relationship between sales taxation and consumer prices. Poterba (1996) finds that increases in sales tax rates are fully shifted to consumers-i.e., retail prices rise by the full amount of the tax. Besley and Rosen (1999) find evidence of overshifting for some commodities-a result they attribute to the less than purely competitive nature of many retail markets. Regardless of which of these views eventually prevails, it is clear that sales tax increases result in increases in the retail prices of taxed goods that may lead to a reallocation of expenditures. In addition, Batina (1996) finds evidence that increases in the sales tax rate in the state of Washington resulted in a decrease in the state's sales tax base.
It is at least conceivable that the increase in the relative taxation of goods, as opposed to services, reduced the relative (after tax) cost of services to consumers and thus induced increases in service consumption. Is the implication that a retail sales tax on goods will result in an increase in service sector output an unambiguous conclusion of economic theory? How large might the effect of the retail sales tax be? In recent years, some states have begun to include more services (such as telecommunications, electronic commerce, personal services, etc.) in the sales tax base (Fox, 1992) . What are the implications of this for relative growth in the goods and services sectors? These are the questions we explore in this study.
DESCRIPTION OF GENERAL SALES TAXES AND SOME THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
Each of the 45 states that impose a sales tax has its own unique operational rules and systems of assessing and administering the tax. In most states, final sales of services are exempt from the sales tax unless specifically enumerated, while final purchases of goods are taxed unless specifically excluded. Generally, the sales tax base includes some portion, but not universal coverage of, both inputs and outputs. Due and Mikesell (1994) present a comprehensive and authoritative discussion of the sales tax. We focus on the fundamental structure of the sales tax and highlight features directly relevant to our analyses.
The most important differences in sales tax practices among states have to do with the treatment of intermediate goods and final and intermediate services. All states exempt from sales taxation transactions of goods that are to be resold (Due and Mikesell, 1983; Egr, Kopnick, Ghiz, and Petrik, 1996) . Some states partially or fully exempt "consumables" (inputs that are "used up" in the production process) and production machinery. There is probably no state in which intermediate inputs are fully exempted, if only because many ordinary household transactions are almost indistinguishable from business purchases of inputs (e.g., the purchase of paper clips). Ring (1999) estimated that approximately 40 percent of sales tax revenue nationwide was collected on sales of business-to-business purchases in 1989. Kuo, McGirr, and Poddar (1988) found that at least one-fourth of Canadian excise tax revenue came from taxation of intermediate transactions.
2 Finally, the state of Minnesota (1995) estimated that 2 They report a direct rate on consumer goods of 6.12 percent and an indirect rate of 2.31 percent. about 46 percent of sales tax revenue resulted from sales to businesses.
States also differ greatly in their taxation of services. Due and Mikesell (1994) identify five categories of service taxation ranging from overall coverage, with nearly all services taxed, to little or no taxation of services. Graesser and Muary (1992) give a complete summary of information about the use of service taxation in various states.
Although each state's sales tax structure is unique, the most important generalizations that we incorporate into our analyses are: (1) a uniform rate on taxed final goods, (2) taxation of some intermediate inputs, and (3) complete exemption of services unless specifically enumerated. To what extent should a tax that has these general features be expected to alter the distribution of final demand between goods and services?
Economic theory tells us that the extent to which the sales tax discourages the purchase of goods and encourages services depends on the price elasticity of taxable goods and the cross-price elasticity of nontaxable services. Although there has been no research attempting to specifically measure the type of distortion that we address in this paper, a number of studies show that consumers are responsive to changes in sales tax rates. For example, Ballard and Shoven (1985) estimated the efficiency effects of a uniform valueadded tax imposed by the national government in the United States as compared to a valued-added tax with exemptions and differential rates. More specifically, they compare a flat rate tax on all personal consumption to one that imposes a lower rate on food and exempts housing and services. Based on estimates derived from a simulation model of the U.S. economy, they find that the welfare loss caused by exemptions and rate differentiation is about 17 percent of gross national product. Mikesell and Zorn (1985) examined the effect of a temporary increase in the sales tax rate in the city of Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. During the 1979-82 period, the sales tax rate in Bay St. Louis was fiveand-a-half percent but only five percent in the surrounding areas. Their analysis demonstrates that the temporary rate differential reduced retail sales in the city. Thus, in a local interjurisdictional framework, retail sales are shown to be responsive to sales tax rate differentials.
More recently, Hawkins (1997) , using microdata on household consumption from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, estimated a price elasticity of generally taxable goods of -0.71 and a cross-price elasticity of consumer services of 0.01. These findings suggest that a sales tax rate of five percent would reduce the expenditures on (taxable) goods by about threeand-a-half percent but have almost no impact on the service sector. We believe there are at least four reasons further analyses are warranted.
(1) As discussed above, only 50 to 60 percent of sales tax revenue is the result of direct household purchases. A substantial amount of sales tax revenue results from intermediate goods purchases. 3 Thus, it is important to study retail purchases of both businesses and households. Whalley's (1989) general equilibrium analysis of lowering the rate and broadening the sales tax base to include more services in Canada obtained the counterintuitive result that production in the service sector increased because of the tax. Whalley and Fretz (1990) attribute this result, at least partly, to the fact that as a result of the broadening of the tax base, "manufacturing expands, [and] We conduct empirical analyses designed to sort out the varied and sometimes conflicting effects of the sales tax as actually implemented in the United States.
DISCUSSION OF THE DATA Dependent Variables
We use state-level data from the Census of Business for 1982 Business for , 1987 Business for , and 1992 to investigate the relationship between state sales tax rates and the relative size of retail goods and service receipts. The Census of Business collects information on retail receipts by detailed kind of business. We have confined our attention to the three most recent Censuses because of the consistent definition of kinds of business over this period. We exclude nonprofit firms from our analyses, since the purchases and receipts of these firms are often treated in a special manner by tax authorities. We also delete health care services because we believe that significant changes in the health care industry over the years included in our study make it difficult to analyze in the simplified framework we use in our analyses.
Basic descriptive information about the dependent variables in our analyses is contained in Table 1 . We study the crossstate-and-time variation in total retail receipts and six subcategories of retail receipts. Overall, retail receipts have been falling as a share of personal income. The only significant exception to this trend is that automotive dealers experienced a sharp upturn between 1982 and 1987 but a decline between 1987 and 1992. The standard deviation of state retail receipts as a share of personal income increased slightly over the period but was only a little more than ten percent of the (weighted) mean share at the end of the period.
Nonhealth care service receipts have grown from 13 to 17 percent as a share of income, while retail receipts have been declining. Subcategories of service receipts that have grown particularly rapidly are business services, amusement and recreation, and legal services. Traditional consumer services such as personal services and automotive and miscellaneous repairs are both a small fraction of personal income and are growing relatively slowly. The cross-state variation in the ratio of service receipts to personal income is much larger than the variation in the ratio of retail receipts to personal income. 5 An unpublished Appendix, available on request, examines the case in which a nondistortionary income tax is replaced by a sales tax on goods. In this case, the uncompensated cross-price elasticity of services understates the increase in consumers' demand for services. The reason for this is that an equal-utility-distortionary sales tax must leave consumers with more income than a nondistortionary income tax. Some of consumers' additional income is used to purchase services. Furthermore, alternatives to the sales tax may not be neutral with respect to the income distribution. Shifting the tax burden across the income distribution may alter the consumption of services since the income elasticity of demand for services varies by income class (Siegfried and Smith, 1991) .
Sales Tax Rates
The central independent variable in our analyses is the sales tax rate. Upon reflection, we realized that no single tax rate could adequately describe a state's sales tax policy. As Due and Mikesell's (1994) discussion makes clear, there are a number of important dimensions on which state sales tax policies differ. We developed eight variables to describe each state's sales tax policy in each year.
6 Table  2 summarizes basic facts about these variables. The consolidated state tax rate (CSTR) is the tax rate applied to most retail goods. To compute the CSTR for each state, we multiplied the statewide statutory rate by one plus the ratio of local to state sales tax revenue. This variable measures the sales tax rate on an average dollar of expenditure of fully taxed goods in the state.
Other tax variables measure the sales tax rate on special categories of purchases. SERVRATE is the tax rate on a narrow category of services such as lawn care maintenance and dry cleaning. DSBROAD is the tax rate on a broader definition of incremental services that might include personal legal services. A state that taxed no services would have SERVRATE = DSBROAD = 0. A state that taxed narrow services at the same rate as most retail goods but did not tax broad services would have CSRT = SERVRATE and DSBROAD = 0.
The variables MACHRATE, DMBROAD, CONSRATE, and DCBROAD describe a state's policy toward the taxation of intermediate transactions. As detailed in Due and Mikesell (1994) , some states exempt sales of machines and equipment used in production from sales taxation, while others do not. Analogous to the tax rates on services, MACHRATE and DMBROAD measure narrow and broad taxation of purchases of equipment to be used in production. Similarly, CONSRATE and DCBROAD measure narrow and broad sales taxation of consumables-inputs that are used up in the production process. Finally, FOODRATE measures the sales tax on purchases of food for home consumption.
As shown in Table 2 , between 1982 and 1992, consolidated sales tax rates have increased. Twenty-seven states had rates exceeding four percent in 1982; by 1992, 42 states had rates exceeding four percent. Over the same period, six states broadened their sales tax base to include some services and four states began taxing a broad array of services. However, some states narrowed their tax bases by relaxing taxation of intermediate goods. Five states excluded sales of production machinery and two states narrowed the taxation of consumables. The number of states that exempted food from sales taxation declined by two. Because consolidated sales tax rates rose, the tax rate on food in states that do tax food increased.
Other Independent Variables
We consider independent variables that might affect either preferences or the budget constraint. Basic summary statistics about the explanatory variables are given in panel A of Table 3 .
Income (REALYPC) measures the variation in average income across states and time. This variable controls for variations in the expenditure share that is due to income effects. Assuming a lognormal income distribution, increasing median income (RMHY), while holding mean income constant (REALYPC), increases the equality of the income distribution. If high-income households consume a disproportionate share of services, equalizing the income distribution will result in a reduction in service consumption. Therefore, we expect that the coefficient on median income (RMHY) will be negative in the equation on service expenditures. 7 The other independent variables in Table 3 are included in the analysis to control for demographic and social differences among the states and over time. These variables are the share of the population that is young (PYOUNG) and old (P65), the proportion of women employed (PFEMEMP), and average household size (HSIZE).
Panel B of Table 3 shows the correlation among the independent variables. Note that several of the variables are highly correlated. This makes it more difficult to infer their separate effects on a dependent variable. In most cases, this is not a significant barrier to our analysis since the main purpose of the independent variables is to control for factors other than sales tax rates that effect the relative size of retail and service receipts as a proportion of income.
We choose this parsimonious list of independent variables on the basis of economic theory, past empirical research (Fuchs, 1968; Falvey and Gemmell, 1996) , and data availability. It is certainly possible to argue that other independent variables should be included or that some of our variables ought to be excluded a priori. However, as we discuss in the next section, our qualitative results are not very sensitive to which subset of these explanatory variables we include in the analyses.
We also control for state fixed effects. State-specific fixed effects account for all factors that are specific to a state and may affect the ratio of retail or service receipts to income. Notably, these variables account for states such as Hawaii or Nevada that may have high service receipts due to a heavy reliance on tourism. State fixed effects also control for a state's established industry mix and political structure that may influence reliance on sales tax revenues. We avoid introducing direct measures of states' industrial structure since these may be endogenously determined.
In several specifications, we also include time-specific effects to account for influences that are specific to a particular time period but are uniform across states. For example, the 1982 recession may have increased retail expenditures' share of income. However, as shown in Table 2 , between 1982 and 1992, there was a widespread increase in sales tax rates, which affected many states. Forty of the 49 states in the sample 8 increased their CSTR between 1982 and 1992. The estimated coefficient on the time-specific effects captures the average increase in the sales tax rate across all states. With both state and time-specific fixed effects, the estimated coefficient on the sales tax rate measures the impact of deviations in the change in the sales tax rate on deviations in the change in the dependent variable. If the deviations from the average change in the sales tax rate are small relative to unmeasured random influences on the dependent variable, our estimated coefficient on the sales tax rate will be imprecise.
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS Econometric Technique and Endogeneity Issues
The data are a panel with 147 observations that include all states (except Alaska) for years 1982, 1987, and 1992 . Two conventional methods for estimating panel data are the fixed effects and random effects procedures. However, if individual states' fixed effects are correlated with the other exogenous variables, a random effects procedure will not yield consistent estimates. A Hausman test shows that the fixed effects technique is appropriate for our analysis and thus we focus our discussion on the fixed effects results.
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Before turning to the empirical results, we first discuss the potential endogeneity of the sales tax rate. Our theoretical framework suggests that changes in sales tax rates alter relative prices and in turn induce a reallocation of resources. In most states, sales tax rates do not change frequently so that we believe it is adequate to treat them as exogenous variables insulated from economic fluctuations in the state.
10 However, it is conceivable that changes in the size of the tax base influence the sales tax rate. Since officials may adjust the sales tax rate to garner the revenue they require, the aggregate sales tax base and rate may be simultaneously determined.
We use a Hausman test to determine whether an endogenous relationship is present (Kennedy, 1992) . To test for endogeneity, we must first identify an appropriate instrument. That is, we must find a variable that is a determinant of sales tax rates but is not a determinant of retail or service activity. One possible candidate is a measure of unanticipated governmental fiscal stress. 11 We consider per capita state government short-term debt (STDPC) as a possible determinant of sales tax rates. Due to the restrictive 8 Alaska is omitted from the sample for technical reasons explained in the Data Appendix. 9 We also conducted (but do not report) a complete set of random effects regressions that are analogous to the fixed effects regressions reported in Tables 5 and 7 . In general, the random effects regressions give stronger support for the hypotheses that increases in the sales tax rate result in decreases in retail receipts and increases in services receipts than the fixed effects results reported in the paper. The random effects results are available from the authors upon request. See Hsiao (1989) for an excellent discussion of panel data estimation techniques. See Kennedy (1992) for a discussion of the Hausman test. This procedure tests for correlation between the error and the regressors. If the regressors are correlated with the error, then the fixed effects estimation procedure yields consistent estimates and the random effects estimates are inconsistent. 10 Both Poterba (1996) and Besley and Rosen (1999) estimate models in which the sales tax rate is assumed exogenous in a regression on the price of taxable goods. 11 We also considered three political economy variables as possible instruments: a measure of Democratic party control, a measure of Republican party control, and a measure of either Democratic or Republican party control. We have no a priori beliefs about whether the Democratic or Republican parties are more or less likely to increase sales tax rates. However, if a political party has control of the state government, house, senate, and gubernatorial office, then it may be more likely to be successful in passing a tax increase, if that is the objective. However, none of the variables we consider are significant determinants of sales tax rates and they therefore are not valid instruments.
nature of state government borrowing, short-term debt usually arises when there is an unexpected revenue shortfall. A revenue shortfall may be the result of an economic recession or an unanticipated change in federal mandates. Since states are typically required to repay the incurred debt within the next fiscal year, they may respond to the shortfall by increasing tax rates in the next fiscal year. However, if a shortfall is a result of economic recession, then raising tax rates may be politically costly. Therefore, the relationship between per capita shortterm debt and sale tax rates is ambiguous. Since our panel includes data from 1982, 1987, and 1992, we use as our measure of fiscal stress the highest value of per capita short-term debt in the preceding five years, making it in most cases a lagged variable. The lagged nature of this variable makes it less likely to be correlated with current retail and service sector activity. We report state fixed effects regressions of the determinants of state sales tax rates in column 1 of Table 4 . In addition to per capita short-term debt, the regression equations include as controls all the exogenous variables from our retail and service models. The results show that STDPC is a significant determinant of the state sales tax rate. While the negative coefficient on STDPC is somewhat surprising, we have identified a valid instrument and can now proceed with the Hausman test.
To conduct the Hausman test, we first calculate the predicted value of the sales tax rate variable from the sale tax rate regression (the first-stage regression). Next, we include the predicted value of the sales tax rate variable in the retail and service equations (the second-stage regressions). If the coefficient on the predicted value of the sale tax rate variable is significant, then sales tax rates are endogenous. In these regressions, if endogeneity is present, then the coefficient on the actual sales tax rate variable is corrected for simultaneity (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991) . However, the coefficients on the predicted sales tax rate in the retail and service equations are not significant. That is, we do not find evidence of endogenous relationships between retail and services and sales tax rates. From these tests, we conclude that endogeneity is not a serious problem in our analysis.
We would like to extend our analysis by testing for the exogeneity of the entire vector of tax rate variables used in our analysis, but this is intractable because it would require that we identify an instrument for each to the eight tax rate variables. We simply do not have enough instruments.
Econometric Results
Estimates of the Basic Model
Estimates of our basic model are presented in Table 5 . Columns (1) and (2) report the results for regressions on retail receipts and columns (3) and (4) report results on service receipts. In columns (1) and (3), we use a fixed effects procedure that allows each state to have its own intercept. In columns (2) and (4), we also include time-fixed effects that allow for the possibility that average share of income spent on retail and service goods is different in different years.
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In column (1), we find a negative and significant coefficient on the CSTR, which indicates that an uncompensated onepoint increase in the tax rate (from say four to five percent) causes a decline of 0.64 in retail receipts' share of income. In column (3), we find that a one-point increase in CSTR results in a 0.41 increase in service receipts' share of income. The coefficients on CSTR are not very sensitive to the inclusion of the other independent variables. If we drop all six independent variables, the magnitude and significance of this coefficient is nearly the same.
The coefficients on the control variables found in columns (1) and (3) also provide useful information about recent shifts in the retail and service sectors. Increasing income leads to a reduction in retail and an increase in services as a share of income. The larger the share of the population that is young, the larger retail receipt's share of income. The larger the share of the population that is old, the more that is spent on services. Holding per capita income constant, increases in median income (i.e., moves toward income equality) result in an increased share of spending on retail goods. Increases in average household size and the proportion of women in the labor force result in an increased share of income being spent on services.
The estimates found in columns (2) and (4) show that our empirical results are sensitive to the inclusion of time dummies. 13 The year dummies are highly significant and result in an insignificant coefficient on the sales tax rate in the retail and service equations. This is not too surprising because sales tax rates have risen across the country at the same time that retail receipts' share of income has fallen and service receipts' share of income has risen. The contemporaneousness of these events makes it difficult to untangle the separate effects of sales tax rates and secular trends. Are the estimates with the state and time dummies superior to those with that control for just the state fixed effects?
In this case, the answer to this question is unclear. To illustrate, compare the coefficients in columns (3) and (4) on the percentage of population over the age of 65. The population is aging fairly uniformly across the states. One might think that as the population ages demand for certain services would increase. This is what the estimates controlling for just the state fixed effects in column (3) indicate. However, column (4) shows that once we control for nationwide trends with time dummies we observe the surprising result that there is no statistically significant relationship between the aging population and 13 When either state fixed effects or time fixed effects alone are included as independent variables, the sales tax rate is inversely related to retail sales but directly related to household services. Thus, it is the combination of state and time dummies that produces insignificant coefficients on the sales tax rate. A formal Wald test of the hypothesis that the coefficients on the time dummies are equal to zero is rejected with a very high level of confidence for both the retail and service equation.
service sector growth (Mullins and Wallace, 1996) . We suggest that it would be unwise to rely solely on the two-way fixed effects model and conclude that the aging population or, for that matter, sales taxation has no effect on service sector growth.
We also conduct, but in the interest of space do not report, 14 a set of regressions similar to Table 5 , except that we use as the dependent variables the retail and services percentages of total receipts (as opposed to percentages of income). This specification is more restrictive in the sense that the two equations form a complete system. Thus, it is only necessary to estimate one of the share equations (either retail or service). The results of these regressions reinforce those reported in the paper in that the magnitude and significance of the coefficient on CSTR is further from zero in nearly every case. We also estimate but do not report a set of first difference regressions that yield results similar to those presented in the paper.
Estimates of the Elaborated Model
We previously discussed the potential importance of sales taxation of intermediate goods and services. When the full complexity of the sales tax system is considered, the effect of the sales tax on the size of the service sector is theoretically ambiguous. In order to empirically examine the impact of taxation of services and intermediate goods, we use the full set of tax rates displayed in Table 2 .
Tax rates on services, intermediate goods, and final goods may be highly correlated and this may pose a challenge in estimating their effects.
15 Table 6 displays the correlation matrix for the tax rates. The R 2 from the auxiliary regression of each tax rate on all the other tax rates is also shown. In a few cases, the simple correlation among tax rates is exceedingly high (DCBROAD and MACHRATE, for example), but in general, we were pleasantly surprised to find that each of the tax rates is, to some extent, a measure of an independent phenomenon.
Goldberger (1991) shows that the variance of an estimated coefficient (b) is a direct function of the R 2 from an auxiliary regression of the variable corresponding to b on all of the other independent variables in the regression. All else equal, increasing the R 2 from the auxiliary regression from zero to 0.5 doubles the variance of the estimated coefficient. Since most of the R 2 values from the auxiliary regressions reported in Table 6 are considerably below 0.5, we have some hope of obtaining confidence intervals around our estimated coefficients that are small enough to be informative.
Regardless, multicollinearity results in neither inefficient nor biased estimators. All of the problems introduced by multicollinearity are fully reflected in the conventionally estimated standard errors. Indeed some of the usual remedies for multicollinearity (ridge regression or dropping some of the theoretically relevant variables) may introduce bias into the estimates. Furthermore, as Goldberger (1991) points out, collinearity between two variables may increase the precision with which we can test hypotheses about combinations of the coefficients on those variables. 16 Since many of the hypotheses we are interested in are about linear combinations of the coefficients on the sales tax variables, we may benefit from, rather than be hindered by, multicollinearity.
For example, the correlation matrix found in Table 6 makes us pessimistic that we can separately infer the effect of each of 14 A complete set of results is available on request from the authors. 15 In their study of the impact of sales taxes on prices, Besley and Rosen (1999) the eight tax rate variables. These variables tend to be correlated with each other so that multicollinearity may result in imprecise estimates of the separate coefficients. However, it is possible to test the joint effect of all of these variables together by testing the hypothesis that the sum of their coefficients is equal to zero. With this introduction, we report results from the elaborated model in Table 7 . In columns (1) and (3), we report results with state fixed effects. Again, the coefficient on CSTR is of the expected sign and statistically significant in both the retail and service equations. Despite the correlation between the vector of sales tax rates, we obtain precise estimates. However, it may be that states increase the sales tax rate on goods, services, and intermediate goods simultaneously. An appropriate policy question then is: Suppose a state simultaneously increases the tax rate on all taxed goods and services; does this affect the allocation of income?
A Wald test, which is reported below the regression results, helps us answer this Table 4 .
The Wald test is the point estimate of the sum of the coefficients on the tax rate variables. In parentheses is the highest probability level at which the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients equals zero can be rejected. question. It gives the highest probability level at which we can reject the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients on the tax rate variables is equal to zero. The precision with which we can test this hypothesis is increased by positive correlations between the tax rates. The results reported in columns (1) and (3) show an inverse relationship between retail receipts and tax rates, but no statistically significant relationship between the tax rates and service receipts. With probability levels of more than 99 percent in the retail equation, the Wald test statistic shows that we have a high level of confidence in the finding. The insignificant Wald test statistic in the service equation suggests that increases in other taxes (service taxation and other taxes) offset the positive effect of the overall rate. The results in columns (2) and (4) show that these relationships are sensitive to the addition of time dummy variables. The Wald test statistic shows a negative (but imprecise) relationship between the tax rate variables and retail receipts and a negative (marginally significant) relationship between the rates and services.
According to the results shown in columns (1) and (3) of both Tables 5 and 7 , we can be reasonably confident that, holding all other sales tax rates constant, an increase in the CSTR lowers retail receipts' share of income and increases service's share of income. However, if we increase all sales tax rates simultaneously, retail falls whereas services are not affected.
Disaggregation of the Dependent Variables
One possible objection to our analysis is that we investigate quite aggregated categories of receipts. It is possible that the sales tax greatly distorts subcomponents of service or retail goods receipts collected within a state but has little effect on aggregate retail or service activity. We believe that our focus on aggregate sectors is appropriate. The policy issue to which we wanted to draw attention was a link between the growth of the overall service sector and sales taxation. A link between specific subsectors of the service sector and sales taxation may be important to traditional concerns about economic efficiency, but it is not directly relevant to our initial research question. Nevertheless, we have tested the robustness of our results by replicating the regressions reported in Table 7 for subsectors of retail goods and services in estimations that are not presented.
17 Using the elaborated model, four of seven components of retail have a negative point estimate for the coefficient on CSTR. Two retail components have point estimates of essentially zero and one (general merchandise) is positive. Similarly, seven of nine components of services have a positive point estimate for the coefficient on CSTR. One service component has a point estimate of essentially zero and one (hotel services) is negative. These findings reinforce our belief that sales tax rate increases have contributed to the relative growth of the service sector.
CONCLUSIONS
During the past several decades, the service sector has grown for many reasons. We believe that increased sales taxation is a contributing factor to the growth of the service sector. Across states, after controlling for many other factors, the value of service receipts as a share of income is positively correlated with the sales tax rate, while the value of retail receipts as a share of income is inversely correlated (see Table 5 , columns (1) and (3)). This correlation is maintained even when we control for sales taxes on intermediate as well as final goods and services (see Table 7 , columns (1) and (3)).
However, because there has been a widespread nationwide increase in sales 17 These estimates are available from the authors upon request. tax rates, we cannot ascertain whether these correlations are spurious. When we include time dummies in our regressions, sales tax rates are not significantly correlated with retail or service receipts as a share of income. This result leaves open the possibility that there is some uniform nationwide trend, other than sales taxation, that is causing the decline in the retail sector.
Of course, in any empirical study, there is the possibility that some unmeasured factor explains the observed phenomenon. However, there is a theoretical link between differential sales taxation and the relative size of the service sector and our empirical evidence is consistent with the theoretical link. Together, the theory and empirical evidence constitute a prima facia case for the hypothesis that increases in sales tax rates increase the relative size of the service sector. Further, the empirical rejection of this hypothesis requires finding theoretically appropriate observed variables that eliminate the explanatory power of sales tax rates in regressions on service and retail receipts.
How large a factor in the growth of the service sector might sales taxes be? The median CSTR increased by about oneand-one-half points (from 4.25 to 5.81) between 1982 and 1992. Using the results in Table 5 (columns (1) and (3)), this increase would cause retail receipts as a share of income to fall by about 0.96 percent and service receipts as a share of income to rise by about 0.62 percent. Thus, about onethird of the decrease in retail receipts and about one-eighth of the increase in service receipts are explained by increasing sales tax rates. In comparison, the increase in the share of females in the labor force (from 0.54 to 0.59) did not significantly contribute to the decline in retail or increase in service receipts. The increasing proportion of the population that is aged (from 0.11 to 0.13) is not a significant determinant of retail receipts, but accounts for about one-fourth of the increase in service receipts. It is therefore reasonable to speculate that sales tax rate increases are more important than increases in female labor participation rates but not as important as the aging population in explaining recent sectoral shifts from the retail to the service sector.
